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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the difference in spending policy behaviour 
between regions having re-running incumbents in the 2015 election and regions 
that have the last-period incumbent.  Hypothetically, re-runner incumbents 
would try to enhance their re-election probability by increasing their targeted 
expenditures in the times leading to the election time; in contrary, the last-
period incumbents will do the opposite. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) cross-
sectional data has been used to analyse the politicians’ behaviour on fiscal 
spending policy for 237 municipalities.  The study result shows that there is no 
difference behaviour between regions having re-running incumbent and 
regions that have last-period incumbent.  Compared to regions with lame ducks, 
grant expenditure tend to be higher on election year in regions having re-
running incumbent. There is also a tendency that the higher grant expenditure 
in the year prior to election, the lower grant expenditure during election year in 
those regions. 
Keywords: Re-running Eligibility; Fiscal Spending; Municipalities; Regional 
Election. 
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I. Introduction 
Prior studies on the executive officers show that re-election eligibility 
can lead politicians to increase their re-election probability. The rational include, 
such as exceeding budget spending, budget deficit policy, maintaining tax in 
the lower level or managing budget composition during election time to attract 
voters’ preference (Klein, 2010; Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Klein and Sakurai, 2015). 
However, most existing literature focus on election time and only a few studies 
are cognisant of and emphasize on the eligibility of being re-elected. Eligibility 
for being re-elected is key, since not all incumbents are eligible, nor have the 
desire to be re-elected. The eligible incumbents who seek for re-election tend 
to build their reputation, and manage some specific budget composition that 
has strong preferences to please prospective voters such as investment 
expenditures (construction of roads, hospitals, etc) over the less-visible like 
current expenditures (wages and payments) (Vergne, 2009; Drazen and Eslava, 
2010; and Klein and Sakurai, 2015). In contrast, those who are ineligible to re-run 
the election may not apply an opportunistic fiscal policy, since they have no 
political motive, nor have less incentive to do so (Klein and Filho, 2011; Klein and 
Sakurai, 2015; Fonseca, 2015). 
In the most developing countries, electorates have difficulties to 
monitor the incumbent’s competency level due to asymmetric information. The 
chance to be re-elected by incumbents and imperfect information by electorates 
on the other side will render more motivation to re-runner politicians to act 
more aggressively pertaining to spending policy, and in turn leads to moral 
hazard. They will maximise their resources in their first period taking account the 
election time, in view of improving their vote-share later on (Shi and Svensson, 
2003; Besley and Case, 1995; Drazen, 2008; Escaleras and Calcagno, 2009; 
Sakurai and Klein, 2015) 
Existing literatures have indefinite conclusions whether re-election 
eligibility has an effect on budget implementation or not. Many of them show 
that it has a positive and significant effect on fiscal spending behaviour, 
meanwhile, other studies have shown the opposite result. Previous studies by 
Johnson and Crain (2004); Besley and Case (1995, 2003); Escaleras and Calcagno 
(2009) Benitto et al. (2012); and Klein and Sakurai (2015) showthat re-running 
incumbent spend more in total and allocate more on highly visible and targeted 
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expenditure upon voters towards the election. However, studies by Nogare and 
Ricciuti (2011) and Fonseca (2016) in Italy and Portugal respectively find that re-
running eligibility has insignificant relationship on per capita spending, while in 
Portugal ineligible incumbents act more conservative that keep maintaining 
collecting more tax in opposite with their people opportunistic behaviour 
regarding fiscal policyAfter “Reformasi” in 1998, Indonesia has undergone 
democratisation processed and transferred a significant degree of power to its 
local governments, particularly in the district level.  However, misuse of local 
budget, money politics, patronages, and political dynasties are still widespread 
in terms of local politics throught the country. Many scholars suggest that the 
regional elections were still stained by rent-seeking behaviour, transactional 
politics, throughout the parties’ internal selection process of candidates to the 
voting period (Aspinall, 2014; and Henderson and Kuncoro, 2011). The existence 
of regional head officer’s tenure limitation law, which stipulates that a candidate 
can be elected for two consecutive times, may persuade incumbents to act more 
aggressively to attract prospective voters.  
Since regional autonomy is heavily concentrated in municipal level, it is 
important to analyse the behavior of Indonesian local head executives at 
subnational level. The local executive heads have been given many authorities 
including on  fiscal policy, while there are some budget components that are at 
their discretion judgment. These budget namely “discretionary funds” could be 
intentionally utilized to impress the voters and enhance their re-election 
prospect later on (Sjahrir et al., 2013; Winoto and Falikhatun, 2015). Re-running 
candidates also tend to allocate the budget not based on reliable benchmarks 
but depend on their vested interests (Ritonga and Alam, 2010).  These kind of 
spending categories usually budgeted as grants, social aid, and financial 
assistance to lower government levels (sub-districts and villages), along with 
investment expenditures are expected to attract electorates (Sjahrir et al., 2013, 
Arifin and Purnomowati, 2017, Setiawan and Rizkiah, 2017).  
This research will focus on the regional public expenditure policy that 
indicated as having  relationship with the  political events. Local government, 
however, remained reliant on the central government as evidenced by 
substantial intergovernmental transfer funds. Brodjonegoro (2001) and Blondal 
(2009) also argue that the fiscal decentralization process in Indonesia focuses 
on expenditure decentralization which approximately account for 90 percent of 
their total budget.   
The Indonesian government has revised the regulation to minimize 
misuse of local budget by the regional government. Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MOHA) has stipulated Regulation No.39/2012 mandating that the distribution 
of grant and social assistance should mention specifically the target of 
beneficiaries. Previous studies show that misuse of budget spending is closely 
related to election time and stronger in incumbent regions (Sjahrir, et al., 2013; 
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Arifin and Purnomowati, 2017). However, the implementation of Regulation No. 
39/2012 on grants and social assistance distribution remains under studied. The 
election year is also well-known as the peak time and the re-running incumbents 
allegedly use budget spending optimally to increase their popularity (Besley and 
Casey, 1995, 2003; Sjahrir et al., 2013; Klein and Sakurai, 2015).  
This study will examine the difference spending policy behaviour in the 
region having incumbents who are eligible to re-run the election and in the 
regions whose executive heads already serve for two periods.  In this study, the 
different behavior is examined through increased government expenditures, by 
analysing total expenditure, investment expenditure, and discretionary funds as 
an aggregate, and disaggregating its subcategories namely: grants, social aids, 
financial assistance expenditure regarding the election year. This study focuses 
on 237 municipalities in Indonesia which held simultaneous direct local elections 
in 2015, not inclusive of 9 municipalities that have eligible incumbent but did not 
see a re-run, 9 provincial regions, and 14 newly-formed regions invloving in the 
local concurrent election. 
According to the results, in general, there is no different behavior 
between regions that have re-running incumbent and regions that have last-
period incumbent during election year except in the grant subcomponent. 
Regions that have re-running incumbents are more likely to increase in the grant 
spending subcomponent in the election time compared to regions that have 
last-term period incumbents. However, the higher grant expenditure in a year 
before the election time, then the lower grant expenditure during election year 
in those regions.  
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 1 on Introduction discusses 
the importance of re-running eligibility on budget spending behaviours and 
some brief fundamental arguments.  Chapter 2 contains Literature Review and 
Empirical Evidence that discuss theories of re-running eligibility and its link with 
the implementation of local fiscal policy expenditure. Chapter 3 on Data and 
Methodology details variables used in the study including sources of the data, 
and the model used to answer research questions. Chapter 4 presents the main 
empirical results and how they relate to the theoretical background exposed in 
the earlier chapter. Chapter 5 On conclusion summarizes the findings and 
provides recommendations for future work. 
II. Literature Review 
The incumbent’s incentive to manage fiscal policy prior to elections has 
been extensively analyzed by both economics and political science scholars 
alike, and supported by diversified theories. One of the main purposes of 
incumbent to do such policy is the probability of being re-elected. Nordhaus 
(1975) initially introduced a theory of politically induced cycles by proposing a 
model whereby incumbents would utilize the macroeconomic policy (balance 
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deficits policy, unemployment policy, and inflation policy) in order to gain 
electoral advantages. The model assumes that the incumbents would attempt 
to create the most wanted economic conditions before elections by applying 
expansionary fiscal policies to stimulate economy growth and create 
constructive circumstances (Nordhaus, 1975).  
Another concept is introduced by Rogoff and Sibart (1988), and Rogoff 
(1990) when narrowing the scope of discussion from macroeconomic 
perspective to only fiscal policy. Both scholars mention that incumbents who 
seek to re-run the election try to send signal of competency upon the 
electorates by using government spending to increase fiscal policy performance 
prior to election time. However, the electorates face asymmetric information and 
struggle to measure politicians’ performance correctly. This circumstance is 
often followed by moral hazard, and leads politicians who are eligible to re-run 
the election to more opportunistic behavior to gain their vested interest (Shi and 
Svensson, 2006).  
Moreover, the larger number of electorates usually in lack of capability 
to identify election-induced fiscal policy manipulations and the incumbent’s 
competence, the more incumbents may get benefit from boosting targeted 
expenditures that has close relationship regarding election outcomes. The 
targeted expenditures in order to please electorates comes from several 
categories such as investment expenditures (building roads, bridges, etc), 
subsidies, donations, and so forth that are higher in an election period than in a 
non-election period. As a result, swing voters will likely keep voting for 
incumbents who provide more targeted expenditures despite the public 
understanding that such expenditures may have electoral motivation afterwards 
(Shi and Svensson, 2006).  
A study by Baleiras and Santos (2000) using their ‘rational-expectations 
opportunistic-type’ model, suggest that when the re-run opportunity emerges 
and there is a motivation for re-election, in-office politicians tend to maximize 
budget spending during their office time periods, which reaches a peak in 
particular in the pre-election time (Balerias and Santos, 2000). Other studies also 
mention that the possibility to re-run in election induce incumbents’ incentives 
to send signal as a ‘higher competent’ agents and in line with their populist 
policy campaign upon their prospective supporters (Baleiras and Santos, 2000; 
Johnson and Crain, 2004; and Smart and Sturm, 2013). However, the 
experienced office-holders who have no concerns on re-election matter will 
have no longer motives to give a good signal, since they do not gain benefits 
afterwards. Those who are not allowed nor have desire to re-run the election 
because of specific motives (e.g. running for gubernatorial or legislative election, 
facing criminal investigation, returning to the initial post, retired) may not apply 
such an opportunistic fiscal policy as much as re-runner incumbents (Sjahrir et 
al., 2013; Besley and Casey, 1995; Fonseca, 2016).  
Setyo Hari Priyono and Prani Sastiono 
148 The Indonesian Journal of Development Planning 
Volume III No. 1 – April 2019 
However, the works of Besley and Casey (1995) and Drazen and Eslava 
(2010) also notice another unique behavior possibility where lame ducks may 
exhibit the opportunistic behavior at their end of office period. Allegedly, they 
have two scenarios towards their post-office life: 1) Lame ducks also attempt to 
build reputation to their special further purposes, like running gubernatorial or 
legislature election, improve the preferred candidate re-election chances; or 2) 
They become more truthful, caring less about their reputation and keep 
continuing their usual business plan. It means, the last-period incumbents tend 
to choose the pave with the least risk for their future career by applying truthful 
policy, leaving the office with a good legacy, and with a hope of having similar 
image as eligible incumbents.    
Existing literatures of re-running possibility on fiscal policy outcome 
have raised mix results, whether it has effect on budget implementation or not. 
Researching on fiscal outcome and the effect of incumbent period limits the 
studies of Besley and Case (1995, 2003) and Alt et al. (2011) in the states that only 
possible to rerun in election two consecutive time maintain that incumbents try 
to build their image upon voters when there is a possibility to re-run election. 
The result of the studies shows that in the states where first-term governors, 
income growth tends to be higher since they care about maintaining political 
good image upon their prospective electorate.  
Other observation by Johnson and Crain (2004) updating Besley and 
Case’s (1995, 2003) earlier studies, and Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) to a panel of 
48 and 52 democraties nation respectively. Both studies have opposite results. 
The first study, using cross-national data, finds that in-tenure restrictions affect 
fiscal outcome differently depending on the implementation of a one-term and 
two-term rule in the observed countries. In contrast, Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) 
find that in countries with presidential system, those who are eligible for re-
election seems to enhance their spending, while in other governmental systems 
there is no significant effect on either fiscal spending policy as well as budget 
balance. 
Studies by Padovano and Petrarca (2014), Klein and Sakurai (2015), and 
Lopes da Fonseca (2016) on Italian, Brazilian, and Portugal municipalities 
respectively show that the re-eligible in-office candidates seems likely to focus 
on maintaining tax setting in lower level during election year compared to the 
other years within their period. Eligible re-runners in Brazil and Portugal 
municipalities eligible however act oppositely while in terms of current 
expenditure policy. In Brazil, they tend to reduce less favorably for electorates 
expenditure such as current expenditure and exceed spending in capital 
expenditures and total expenditures (Klein and Sakurai, 2015). Their evidence 
shows that re-runners focus on certain highly concerned spending by 
electorates including capital investment expenditure, while reducing the total 
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spending to send a good message that they have higher-level competences. In 
contrast, in Portugal, they tend to increase in current expenditure during 
election time where subsidies and personnel budget are included in this 
category. Their explanation is that the incumbents eligible for re-election have 
appeared to engage in distortionary policies relative to the last-period 
incumbents (Fonseca, 2016). 
Specific to the local governments in Indonesia, Ritonga and Alam (2010) 
find that the allocation of grant and social assistance expenditure in incumbent 
regions during the election year is higher than prior to the elections. As 
mentioned, evidence from the studies by Sjahrir et al. (2013) and Winoto and 
Falikhatun (2015) find that discretionary funds spending is positive and 
significant nearing and during election time respectively. Taufiq and 
Purnomowati (2017) investigate the possibility of misuse of discretionary funds 
in local governments’ budget by incumbents before election and find higher 
proportion of budget allocation on grant and social assistance expenditure 
related to incumbent regions during the local election in 2015. 
Law No. 8 of 2015 mandates that from 2015 to 2018, local elections have 
to be implemented every 5 (five) years simultaneously on the same date 
throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, 
2015).  The election on 9 December 2015 was only one of the three rounds of 
simultaneous regional elections in Indonesia covering 269 regions in Indonesia; 
other rounds were held in 2017 and 2018. According to the regional law, the 
regional executives are elected as a pair. However, the person who can rule the 
region as well as has discretionary power attached to the regional head instead 
of his vice. Furthermore, the vice regional head only supports and give advice 
to the elected mayors.  Therefore, this study will be limited incumbent that has 
an eligibility to re-run in the election in two circumstances. First, when the 
regional head and his vice split and re-run as competitor, then the regional head 
become an eligible incumbent instead of his deputy since he has discretion 
control. Second, when only the vice regional head able to re-run in the election 
while the regional head decide to not re-run the election because of any specific 
reason (running governor election, retired, etc) or ineligible to re-run the 
election due to the limit of tenure, then he cannot also be called as an eligible 
incumbent candidate.  
III. Methodology 
This research uses a set of data on public spending of districts and 
municipalities which held simultaneous direct head local elections over the 
period 2013-2015. The unit of observation is the municipality level in Indonesia 
held regional election in 2015, a total of 237 districts and cities. Data related to 
local government expenditures are resourced from the reports by Directorate 
General of Fiscal Balance, Ministry of Finance and Government Financial 
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Statistics Regency/City from Statistics Indonesia (Central Statistics Agency/ BPS).  
Political data consisting of the incumbents eligible for running re-election and 
decide to re-run in the election, and the last-period incumbents also local 
election result, were obtained from various sources, including General Election 
Commission (KPU), Ministry of Home Affairs (KPU, MoHA), and The Association 
for Elections and Democracy (Perludem).   
This study also uses several control variables to describe districts’ social-
economics and demographic. The demographic data used to describe society 
condition in regions, represented by adult literacy rate and population between 
2013 and 2015 is extracted from the National Socio-economy Survey (Susenas), 
and 2010 Indonesia Population Census and its projection, respectively. Other 
control variables are district size and dummy cluster Island as released from 
MoHA and Ministry of Economic Affairs (MoEA), respectively. 
In this research, a model is used to analyze the difference in the 
behavior on fiscal performance between eligible re-runner and those in the last 
term. The model also analyses the current office holder behavior by capturing 
the amount of local government expenditure persistence in a two-year prior to 
the election time frame.  The model is specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2015 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2014 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2013 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2014 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 
This study estimates the equation using the fiscal policy variables 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2015 
on the left-hand side, which include total expenditures and budget deficits. This 
study also examines the highly visible to the electorate expenditures 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2015 
namely investment expenditure and discretionary expenditures (consist of 
grants, financial assistance, and social assistance expenditure).  All dependent 
variables are expressed in logarithmic terms. The vector  are control 
variables representing economic, demographic, and political variables that 
affect local budget performance.  The main variable of this study is Rerun, a 
dummy variable to capture an eligibility of current incumbents for re-running 
re-election and the decision to re-run.  This study also analyses the interaction 
between the eligible incumbent and seek for re-election and the lag of the 
dependent t-1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2014 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, variable used to capture persistence in the fiscal 
variables. 
Other factors include Revenue (lnRevenue); education rate of the 
people proxy by adult literacy rate (LitRate); total population size (lnPopsize); 
DisctrictSize by constructing a variable in logarithms as well. Regarding literacy 
rate, this study excludes a demographic variable that represents the percentage 
of the population under 15 years old (% Pop < 15), ineligible to vote in any 
elections. A dummy City and Islandscluster variable are in place to capture the 
heterogeneity as well as financial disparities of each regions. Finally, the variable 
denotes  represents the regression error term.  
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This empirical model uses cross-sectional data and we apply typical 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimators. However, in order to minimize 
heterogeneity problem robust option is added by through applying several 
steps. First step is analyzing the re-runner in the election incumbents on fiscal 
spending behavior with full observation (246 municipalities) including 9 
municipalities that have the eligible incumbents that have no desire to be re-
elected. Then, this study also examines the opportunistic behavior of the eligible 
incumbents’. The last step, this study analyses the behavior through dropping 
the municipalities that no allocating any budget in grants, social assistance, and 
financial assistance expenditure. These steps are important to know whether the 
result have similar pattern or not. 
The coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 > 0, will confirm the basis argument of re-runner 
incumbent opportunistic behaviour proposition (Besley and Case, 1993, 2005; 
Sjahrir et al., 2013; and Klein and Sakurai, 2015).  It suggests that incumbents 
who are not re-running in the election for the second tenure act differently than 
those who seek for another term, which is more truthful, conservative, and have 
less incentive to manipulate local budget. 
According to the underline argument on the theoretical framework, in 
this study, the persistence of budget spending behavior by re-runner 
incumbents can be assessed through an increase in government spending by 
reviewing total expenditures, investment expenditures, and discretionary 
expenditures in sum and its each subcategory including grants, social assistance, 
and financial assistance expenditure in the year before and during the election 
year.  
The first dependent variable is total expenditure. Re-runner can 
increase the total expenditures to finance their populist programs to persuade 
prospective voters. They try to build their image while keep controlling budget 
deficit to reflect that they are capable leaders to enhance re-election prospects 
(Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Drazen and Eslava 2010; and Chortareas, 2016). 
Regarding investment expenditure, re-runner incumbents tend to spend more 
in this type of expenditure that is favored by voters and potentially have large 
benefit due to the election prospects.  Several studies find evidences which 
suggest that election-year interaction with incumbents and public spending 
become relatively more visible, as reflected in healthcare, educational, and 
infrastructure construction spending approaching election years, than less 
visible expenditure such as current expenditures, in particular wages and 
subsidies (Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Drazen and Eslava 2010; and Chortareas, 
2016). This particular fiscal spending categories has highly visibility to attract 
prospective supporters and to gain higher vote-share likelihood. Therefore, an 
eligible incumbent candidate is expected to have a positive relation to 
investment expenditure. 
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The last discussion is related to Discretionary funds and its 
disaggregation: grant, social assistance, and financial assistance expenditure. 
These expenditure categories can be spent relatively flexible in contrast to other 
type of expenditures and have displayed a strongly cyclical behavior in direct 
elections, especially when the incumbent is re-running the election (Sjahrir et al., 
2013). Other studies on incumbent regions such as Ritonga and Alam (2010) and 
Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) investigate the allocation of donation and social 
assistance expenditures between incumbent and non-incumbent candidates 
and find that the distribution of donation and social assistance expenditure in 
incumbent regions during the election year was higher compared to 
approaching the election time. In this study, an eligible incumbent candidate is 
expected to have a positive relation to discretionary funds as aggregate, and 
when differentiate it to grants, social aids, and financial aids expenditure. 
Therefore, this study hypothesis is: 
H1: Regions that have eligible incumbents who decide to re-run the 2015 
election will have higher fiscal spending compared to regions with last-term 
incumbents ( >0). 
IV. Result and Analysis 
Descriptive analysis provides an overview of the basic features of the 
data that used in the research. This analysis also describes the modest synopses 
related to the observation (population or sample) as well as its measures. The 
descriptive statistics of this study is presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (1) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rerun 237 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Literacy Rate 237 94.59 8.18 32.56 100 
Popsize 237 485,827.8 544,445.1 18,186 3,534,114 
District Size 237 6,829.093 25,929.1 25.24 313,040 
Island Cluster 237 2.01 1.725877 0 5 
Revenue 237 1,345,470 838,656.8 223,282.9 6,619,031 
Source: Dataset constructed by the author 
The table shows a summary of all variables that used in this study. Total 
observations are 237 regions (districts, and cities) which held a simultaneous 
direct head election in 2015, not inclusive 9 municipalities that have eligible 
incumbents but not re-run in the election. First, statistical description above 
shows that the mean value of re-runner is 0.66, which means the region held a 
simultaneous direct election that has re-running incumbent is 64 percent or 
around 153 regions.  Second, the mean of adult literacy rate in Indonesian 
regions held the occurrence election in 2015 is 94.59 percent which is sufficiently 
high.  
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In the district size, in average observed municipalities have an area 
about 6664.99 per square kilometre, with standard deviation of 25464.97 km. 
Finally, in dummy variable island clusters show the mean of island clusters is 
2.01, with a standard deviation of 1.72 consisting six main island development 
corridors with Java Island as base.  In terms of Revenue, the mean value of is 
1,345,470 (in million rupiah) and the standard deviation is 838,656 (in million 
rupiah).  However, the minimum value is 223,282 (in million rupiah) in Bantul, 
and the maximum value is 619,031 (in million rupiah) for Teluk Bintuni. The 
descriptive statistics of fiscal variable in this study is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (2) 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Expenditure  237 1,381,494 906,258.1 477,740.6 6,775,373 
Investment Exp.  237 335,319.5 303,463.8 51,980.73 2,820,502 
Discretionary Funds  237 148,423.7 113,667.4 1,487.206 626,159.4 
Grant Exp.  237 60,942.23 50,660.72 0 292,942.6 
Social Assistance Exp.  237 7,924.658 13,352.58 0 102,557.5 
Financial Asisstance Exp.  237 79,556.81 81,523.04 0 502,359.8 
Source: DJPK, Dataset constructed by the author  
Note: in million rupiahs 
On total expenditures, the mean value is 1,381,494 (in million rupiah) 
with standard deviation of 906,258. The minimum value is 477,740 (in million 
rupiah), which for Kota Solok, and the maximum value is 6,775,373 (in million 
rupiah), which in Kutai Kartanegara. It means that Kota Solok spent 477 million 
rupiah in 2015, while Kutai Kartanegara spent around 6.8 trillion rupiah in 2015, 
being the highest. 
On the investment, expenditure has a mean value of 335,319 and the 
standard deviation is 303,463. The maximum value of investment expenditure is 
2,820,502 (in million rupiah), which for Kutai Kartanegara, and the minimum 
value was 51,980.7 (in million rupiah), which for Rembang regency. It means that 
Kutai Kartanegara spent their capital budget for around 2,8 trillion rupiahs, while 
Rembang expended 51,9 billion rupiahs in capital expenditure category. 
The summary of discretionary funds category for regions held a 
simultaneous direct election in 2015 are as follows. The discretionary funds per 
se have the mean value of 11.61, while the standard deviation is 0.83.  It also has 
the minimum amount of 1,487 (in million rupiah) for Kota Pemalang and has the 
highest value of 626,159 (in million rupiah) in Bengkalis. It means, Bengkalis 
district allocated more than 600 billion rupiahs in “flexible” category budget, in 
opposite way, Kota Pemalang only allocate 1,48 billion rupiah in this sector 
budget. 
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The regression result, showing the effect of the eligibility of being re-
elected on fiscal outcome in regions conducted simultaneous direct election in 
Indonesia in 2015, as follow. 
Table 3. The Effect of the Eligibility of Being Re-elected on Fiscal Policy 
Variables Dependent (lnSpending) 
Independent Total 
Exp. 
Investment 
Exp. 
Discretonary 
Funds 
Grant 
Exp. 
Social 
Aid 
Financial 
Aid 
Expenditure 
(t-1) 
0.254** 0.562*** 0.179*   0.072 0.718*** 0.076    
  (0.099) (0.108) (0.093)    (0.056) (0.250) (0.109)    
Expenditure 
(t-2) 
0.167** 0.083 0.099    0.263* 0.212* 0.061    
  (0.073) (0.080) (0.072)    (0.159) (0.112) (0.063)    
Re-run 0.038 0.763 -0.484    1.276** -0.478 -1.545    
  (0.366) (0.772) (0.948)    (0.626) (1.967) (1.271)    
Re-run*Exp. 
(t-1) 
-0.002 -0.060 0.042    -0.150** 0.089 0.162    
  (0.027) (0.062) (0.086)    (0.067) (0.218) (0.137)    
LnRevenue 0.580*** 0.485*** 0.393**  0.479 0.472 0.074    
  (0.111) (0.103) (0.191)    (0.320) (0.558) (1.065)    
lnpPopsize -0.013 -0.100** 0.064    -0.018 -0.383 0.015    
  (0.018) (0.043) (0.080)    (0.135) (0.296) (0.445)    
Literacyrate -0.000 -0.003* -0.001    0.012 0.004 -0.023    
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)    
lnDistrictsize 0.005 0.008 0.017    0.071 -0.262* -0.245    
  (0.006) (0.020) (0.047)    (0.126) (0.143) (0.355)    
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Islandcluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.229 -0.765 2.389    -0.374 -0.521 11.647    
  (0.443) (0.863) (1.625)    (2.528) (5.033) (10.523)    
N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
    Source: Author Estimation 
    Denote significance at the ***1%; **5; *10% levels. 
The main interest variable of this study is the interaction of re-running 
the election factor and targeted budget expenditures category in the election 
time (Rerun), which identifies the budget utilization deviation between re-
running incumbents and the last-term incumbents in regions conducting 2015 
simultaneous election. Moreover, we also analyze persistency of local budget 
utilization in election year compared to one year and/or second year before the 
election year.  
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The result, shows that in general, there is no difference spending 
behavior between regions that have re-runner incumbents and regions that 
have second-period incumbents in most of the observed spending categories 
during the election year except in the grant subcomponent. Regions that have 
re-runners are on average have 1.3% (at 5% significant level) higher level of 
grant spending subcomponent compared to regions with last-term incumbents.  
However, the higher the grant expenditure in a year before the election time 
(re-run*expenditure t-1), then the lower the grant expenditure during election 
year in those regions. This regression results show that when regions have 
incumbent who seek for re-election, on average for every 1% increase in grant 
expenditure in the year prior to the election leads to 0.15 % (at 5% significant 
level) decrease in grant budget subcategory during election time. 
The results in general show that the effect of the re-running eligibility 
on spending is not statistically significant. This seems to correlate with the fact 
that among regions with lame duck incumbents, more than half have vice head 
who were running in 2015 election.  This means there might be an incentive for 
them to use spending to affect their re-electability, which is similar to the 
condition in regions with re-running head. 
However, there is a difference in grant expenditure between regions 
that have re-running head and regions that have lame ducks. It is likely that re-
runner incumbents prefer to choose this kind subcomponent spending that can 
be utilized for the sake of their group or their vested interest.  Grants 
expenditure become popular among re-running incumbents compared to other 
type of expenditures, because they can raise the spending in election year to 
distribute the donation relatively flexible, massive, and seems have direct effect 
on voter’s welfare. They can donate it to religious and/or social institutions 
(mosques, churches, etc.) civil group activities (“Majlis Taklim”, youth 
organization, NGO at local level) and even sport association to improve their 
good image upon electorates. In contrast, other type of expenditures, such as 
investment expenditure in general still needs more time to gain visible results 
upon voters, while social assistance expenditure usually more focus on individual 
or families rather than institutions.  
This evidence also consistent with previous studies that during the 
period of the election incumbents tend to increase grant budget spending 
(Ritonga and Alam, 2010; Arifin and Purnomowati, 2017). Moreover, Ritonga and 
Alam (2010) works also notice that incumbents tend to allocate more in grant 
budget subcategory in the election time compared to a previous year of the 
election time.  
The implementation of the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 
39 of 2012 which gives stricter rules to allocation of grant, however, still not 
enough to control an opportunistic behavior in expenditure during the 2015 
Setyo Hari Priyono and Prani Sastiono 
156 The Indonesian Journal of Development Planning 
Volume III No. 1 – April 2019 
regional head general election. Therefore, the existence of the restrictions on 
grant expenditure and social assistance expenditure based on the regional 
government regional finance ability (fiscal space) is urgently needed. This 
prohibition should be stated in the government regulation policies to improve 
the existing regulation on donation and social aid distribution. 
In the 2015 simultaneous regional election, according to KPU (2017) 
studies there was a phenomenon that in the region that incumbents re-running 
the election tend to fulfil the election budget that requested from the regional 
election commission. According to Law No. 10/2016 on Governor, Regents, and 
Mayor Elections, regional elections are funded by regional government budget 
and put the budget on the grant subcomponent. As a result, local government 
has to finance in order to conduct the regional election from their own budget, 
and allocate it as a grant to the regional election commission (KPK, 2018). They 
seem likely that they have their vested interest to ensure the election held well 
and at the same time will increase their good image as a capable leader.  
The effect of incumbents’ eligibility interaction on fiscal policy in 2015 is 
also influenced by budget expenditure in the previous year.  As mentioned, it is 
shown that in most of the observed expenditure categories in 2015 has a positive 
and significant with the budget period of the year before election time 
(Expenditure t-1), except in grant and financial assistance budget subcategories. 
Regarding total expenditures and investment expenditure, the result confirms 
that if there is a change in one year prior to election time by 1 percent, we would 
expect that such expenditures in 2015 to change by 0.25 per cent and 0.56 per 
cent (at 5 per cent and 1 per cent significant level respectively). Similarly, a 
positive and significant relationship also occurs in discretionary funds as an 
aggregate, and when differentiate into social assistance expenditure. If there is 
a change by 1 per cent in 2014 budget spending, we expect that such 
expenditures in election time (2015) to change by 0.18 percent, and 0.72 per cent 
respectively. However, within two years prior to election budget expenditure 
(Expenditure t-2) only in social assistance spending that demonstrates a 
dependent relationship. It means, if there is a change by 1 percent in social 
assistance expenditure in two years before election, there will be a change by 
0.24 per cent in 2015 (at 5 per cent significant level). These pieces of evidence 
are aligned with the existing studies, where there is a significant increase in both 
discretionary funds in a year before election (Arifin and Purnomowati, 2017) and 
by disaggregating into grant expenditure (Arifin and Purnomowati, 2017; 
Setiawan and Rizkiah, 2017). Moreover, Arifin and Purnowati (2017) works also 
suggest that during 2 years prior to election there are might be a misuse of 
regional budgetary spending and revenue for the sake of individual and groups, 
in particular in social assistance spending in order to create impression upon the 
voters. 
Setyo Hari Priyono and Prani Sastiono 
157 The Indonesian Journal of Development Planning 
Volume III No. 1 – April 2019 
The control variables show that regional budget spending has positive 
and significant relationship with the total income of the region. These 
ciscumstances that can reflect well-functioning economy circumstance in its 
regions (Escaleraz and Calcagno, 2009; Sjahrir et.al, 2013). Regional revenue 
(lnRevenue) has a strong relationship to total expenditure and investment 
expenditure, and discretionary budget categories. The analysis result shows that 
if there is a change in revenue by 1 percent, then in such expenditures will 
change by 0.58 per cent and 0.48 per cent (both at 1 per cent significant level) 
respectively. The discretionary budget category shows that if there is an increase 
in revenue per capita by 1 per cent then in such expenditures are expected to 
increase by 0.39 per cent, (at 5 per cent significant level). This finding is also 
consistent with previous studies which suggest that discretionary spending has 
positive and significant relationship to discretionary funds (Sjahrir et al., 2013; 
Setiawan and Purnomowati, 2017). This evidence also reflects that the regional 
budget spending is closely related to the amount of revenue received by 
regional government. 
On the number of populations (lnPopsize), there is a negative and 
statistically significant effect on investment expenditure. The result suggests that 
if there is an increase in population number by 1 percent, it would expect that 
municipalities’ investment expenditure decrease by 0.1 percent (at 5% significant 
level). This result seems contrary with previous studies which show the number 
of populations have positive and significant effect on budget spending, 
particularly in discretionary spending (Sjahrir, et al., 2013; Arifin and 
Purnomowati, 2017).  
Interestingly, findings also related to Literacyrate show it has negative 
and significant relationship on investment, discretionary funds, and grant 
expenditure. It means, if there is an increase by 1 percent literacy rate in such 
regions, then it would expect that investment expenditure decrease by 0.004 % 
(at 5% significant level) and by 0.003% (at 10% significant level). This result 
accordance with the previous studies that government tend to allocate carefully 
in such targeted expenditure when the level of ability of citizens to monitor the 
government policy sufficient (Sjahrir, et al., 2013). 
The table above also shows that ln District size result suggest a positive 
and significant connection on the total expenditure and grant expenditure, while 
it has a negative and significant effect on social expenditure. It means, an 
increase by 1 percent district areas will raise total spending about 0.01 per cent 
(at 10 per cent significance level). Similarly, the size of also become one of the 
considerations for municipalities government to spend budget in discretionary 
funds, particularly to distribute social expenditures among citizens. According 
to statistics result, an increase by 1 per cent of district size, then will decrease 
social assistance spending about 0.25 per cent (at 10 per cent significance level). 
This finding shows that the wider of regions areas might affects government to 
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spend less in social assistance expenditure. Finally, regarding City shows that in 
Kota municipalities ten to decrease by 0.71 per cent and 2.89 per cent in 
discretionary funds and financial assistance expenditure respectively than in 
Kabupaten municipalities. 
V. Conclusion 
This study aims to empirically prove whether there is a difference in 
fiscal spending behaviour between regions that have eligible incumbents re-
running in the 2015 election and regions that have lame duck incumbents. The 
empirical model is applied to cross-sectional data and estimated using OLS 
method. This research uses public spending data of districts and cities in 
Indonesia which held simultaneous head local elections in 2015 over the period 
2013-2015. The unit of observation is 237 municipalities in Indonesia.  
According to the result, in general there is no difference spending 
behavior between regions that have re-runner incumbents and regions that 
have second-period incumbents in most of the observed spending categories 
during the election year (except in the grant subcomponent).  However, the 
higher grant expenditure in a year before the election time, then the lower grant 
expenditure during election year in those regions.  
The results in general show that the effect of the re-running eligibility 
on spending is not statistically significant. This seems to correlate with the fact 
that among regions with lame duck incumbents, more than half have vice head 
who were running in 2015 election. There might be an incentive for them to use 
spending to affect their re-electability similar to the condition in regions with re-
running head. However, there is a difference in the grant expenditure between 
regions that have re-running head and regions that have lame ducks. It is likely 
that re-runner incumbents prefer to choose this kind of subcomponent 
spending that can be utilized for the sake of their group or their vested interest.   
Grants expenditure become popular among re-running incumbents 
compared to other type of expenditures, because they can raise the spending 
during the election year, and distribute the donation in relatively flexible, 
potentially have large benefit, and bring direct effect on voter’s welfare. They 
can donate it to religious and/or social institutions, civil group activities, and 
even sport association to improve their good image upon electorates. In 
contrast, other type of expenditures, such as investment expenditure in general 
would needs more time to gain visible results upon voters, while social 
assistance expenditure usually more focus on individual or families rather than 
institutions. 
Therefore, the revision of the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation 
Number 39 of 2012 which gives stricter rules to allocation of grant, however, will 
still not enough to control an opportunistic behavior in expenditure during the 
2015 regional head general election. The restrictions regulation on grant 
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expenditure and social assistance expenditure based on the regional 
government regional finance ability (fiscal space) is urgently needed. This 
prohibition also should be stated in the government policies to improve the 
existing regulation on donation and grants distribution. 
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